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tations to his clients. Moreover, had a contest been success-
ful, the recovery would not have been negligible. The net 
value of the estate was approximately $1,934. The next of 
kin, nieces and nephews, numbered seven, two of whom were 
clients of petitioner. Each of petitioner's clients, therefore, 
would have recovered approximately $276. 
Even if petitioner's clients did not suffer loss by his 
misconduct, he would not avoid disciplinary action. (Lady v. 
State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 497, 504 [170 P.2cl 460] ; Picket·ing v. 
State Ba1·, 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [148 P.2d 1] ; Utz v. State Bar, 
21 Cal.2d 100, 105 [ 130 P .2d 377].) Without authority of his 
clients petitioner dismissed the contest. Thereafter, he re-
peatedly misrepresented the status of the contest proceeding 
and kept his clients in ignorance of his unauthorized dis-
missal. When complainants on their own initiative uncov-
ered his deception, the opportunity to contest the will had 
passed. By his duplicity petitioner destroyed the claims of 
his clients, which he was engaged to protect and enforce. 
Such conduct involves moral turpitude and warrants the dis-
cipline recommended. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580 
[122 P.2d 549] ; Marsh v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 303, 307 [291 P. 
583] .) 
Petitioner is suspended from the practice of law in this 
state for a period of nine months commencing thirty days 
after the filing of this order. 
[L. A. Nos. 21002, 21003. In Bank. May 11, 1951.] 
CI'rY OF PASADENA, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF 
LOS ANGELES, Appellant. 
[1] Taxation-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Munici-
pality.-Const., art. XIII, § 1, excepting from tax exemption 
such lands and improvements of a municipal corporation lying 
outside its corporate limits as were subject to taxation when 
acquired by the municipality, is not concerned with assessed 
valuation 'before or after such acquisition, but deals only 
with whether any improvements were constructed by the city 
after it acquired the property. 
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 101; 51 Am.Jur. 555. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Taxation, § 74. 
37 C.2d-5 
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[2] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.-
Tn excepting from tax exemption such lands and improvements 
of a municipal corporation lying outside its corporate limits 
as were subject to taxation when acquired by the municipal-
ity, Const., art. XIII, § 1, intended to preserve for taxation not 
only the identical improvements existing at the time of acqui-
sition, but also substitutes for the same and replacements 
thereof, as distinguished from those of an entirely new charac-
ter not theretofore existing in any form. 
[3] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.-
To come within the constitutional exemption from taxation, 
improvements constructed by a municipal corporation on 
property lying outside its corporate limits must be wholly new 
structures, and replacements of improvements existing on such 
property when acquired by the city are not improvements 
within such exemption. 
[ 4] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.-
Replacements of improvements existing on property outside 
the corporate limits of a municipality at the time of its 
acquisition by the city are taxable according to the current 
value of the "replaced improvements" and not aceording to 
the value of the original improvements. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed. 
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgments for 
plaintiff on overruling demurrers to complaints and defend-
ant's failure to answer, reversed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, A.. Curtis Smith, 
Assistant County Counsel, and John D. Maharg, Deputy 
County Counsel, for Appellant. 
H. Burton Noble, City Attorney, and Frank L. Kostlan, 
Assistant City Attorney, for Respondent. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), and Gill-
more Tillman, Chief Assistant City Attorney, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-In two actions to recover taxes paid under 
protest by plaintiff city to defendant county, one for the fiscal 
year 1945-46, the other for the fiscal year 1946-47, defendant's 
demurrers were overruled, and it failing to answer, judgments 
for plaintiff were entered. 
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The controversy involves the application of the constitu-
tional provision reading: ''All property in the state except 
as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under 
the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as herein-
after provided . . . provided, that property . . . as may be-
long ... to any ... municipal corporation ... shall be ex-
empt from taxation, except such lands and the improvements 
thereon located outside of the ... municipal corporation 
owning the same as were subject to taxation at the time of the 
acquisition of the same by said . . . municipal corporation; 
provided, that no improvements of any character whatever 
constructed by any . . . municipal corporation shall be sub-
ject to taxation. All lands or improvements thereon, belong-
ing to any . . . municipal corporation, not exempt from taxa-
tion, shall be assessed by the assessor of the county . . . in 
which said lands or improvements are located, and said assess-
ment shall be subject to review, equalization and adjustment 
by the state board of equalization.'' (Cal. Const., art. XIII, 
§ 1.) 
Plaintiff pursued its administrative remedy (see City & 
County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo, 36 Cal.2d 
196 [222 P.2d 860]) and was denied relief by the State Board 
of Equalization. 
The facts fitting the law as declared in the constitutional 
provision quoted are : That plaintiff owns property and im-
provements thereon consisting of a water system located out-
side its city limits, but within defendant county which were 
subject to taxation at the time of their acquisition; that de-
fendant's assessor assessed for taxation those improvements 
at $56,310 for the first year and at $51,640 for the second 
year; that certain of said improvements were constructed by 
plaintiff since acquisition of the property by it ''to replace'' 
improvements that were subject to taxation at the time of 
acquisition; that the assessor placed a value on the "replaced 
improvements" on the basis of the value thereof as they ex-
isted on the first Monday of March of the respective years, 
although the ''replaced improvements'' were larger and more 
substantially constructed, and of greater value than the im-
provements they replaced; and that they were constructed to 
serve a different purpose in that they were larger and would 
serve more parts of the water system. 
Plaintiff contends that the assessor should have fixed the 
value of such ''replaced improvements'' at the value the 
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original improvements would have had as of the first Monday 
in March of the respective tax years, rather than the value 
at that time of the "replaced improvements" which is a much 
higher figure. In other words, it says that when improvements 
are replaced, the replacements should not be taxed at their 
current value, but at the current value of the improvements 
originally on the property when acquired, because the increased 
value, by reason of the replacing of the original improvements, 
is, in effect, a new improvement which is not covered by the 
exception to the exemption in the constitutional provision 
above quoted. We cannot agree. 
[1] The constitutional provision is not concerned with 
assessed valuation before or after acquisition by the municipal 
corporation. It deals only with whether or not any improve-
ments were constructed by the city after it acquired the prop-
erty. They either are or are not improvements so constructed 
regardless of their value. The first part of the constitutional 
provision deals with valuation as distinguished from the part 
here involved, which, by its languag·e, embraces what property 
is taxable. While the precise issue here was not involved, 
the whole tenor of the cases heretofore decided by this court 
points to this conclusion. (City & County of San JfTancisco 
v. County of San Mateo, 17 Cal.2d 814 [112 P.2d 595]; City 
& County of San JfTancisco v. County of San Mateo, supra, 
36 Cal.2c1 196.) In the first case the issue was whether a 
concrete flume which the city built to replace a wooden one 
was an improvement constructed by the city after acquisition 
of the property and thus exempt from taxation. [2] vVe held 
it was not exempt as it was only a replacement, and stated: 
''In furtherance of that purpose the intent of the amendment 
must have been to p1"eserve for taxation not only the identical 
improvements existing on the property at the time of the 
acquisition of the property by the m~micipality, but also S1tb-
stitutes for the same and replacements thereof. The improve-
ments constructed on the property by the municipality which 
are exempt, are only such as are of an entirely new character 
ancl not theretofore existing in any foTrn. In this connection 
it may be noted the words 'construct, constructed and con-
struction' generally import the creation of something new and 
original that did not exist before rather than replacement, 
repair or improvement. [Citations.] Otherwise by merely 
repairing, enlarging· or replacing existing improvements, the 
county in which the property was located would lose the tax 
revenues formerly received from such improvements, while 
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the municipality would be enjoying the same use and benefits 
from the improvement as it did prior to the replacement, at 
least to the extent of the value of the improvement. as it 
originally existed.'' (Emphasis added.) In the second case 
the problem was whether a fill made after acquisition was an 
and thus exempt from taxation. We held it was 
pointing out that the test was whether the fill consti-
tuted an improvement, stating (p. 198): "If the fill consti-
tntes an as contemplated by the constitutional 
amendment, it is to that extent exempt, and the county had no 
power to take it into consideration in making the assessment 
. . . Retained within the exemption provision were 'improve-
ments of any character whatever constructed' by the city. 
'Construction' or 'constructed' means the creation of some-
that did not exist before as distinguished from replace-
ment or repair. (San Francisco v. San Mateo Connty, sttpra, 
17 Cal.2d at 819, citing cases.) The obvious purpose was to 
permit the assessment of the property which was in existence 
at the time it was acquired by the city. The assessment in 
successive years of that much of the municipally-owned prop-
was made subject to review, equalization and adjustment. 
'l'he phrase 'improvements of any character whatever' must 
be held to include any addition (i.e., excluding matters of 
ancl replacentent) to the property as it was when 
acquired. The amendment does not define 'improvements' 
beyond the descriptive language 'improvements of any char-
acter whatever.' It is difficult to perceive what more inclusive 
language could have been employed to express the intent to 
preserve to the county a continuation of the property on the 
tax rolls as a source of revenue restricted, however, in each 
successive year to an equalized valuation of the property before 
the addition of any construction." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff argues that in the first case the assessed value was 
the current value of the original improvements. Be that as 
it may, the point stressed is, what may be taxed. 
[3, It argues that the purpose of the constitutional pro-
vision is to keep on the tax rolls improvements ''as were subject 
to taxation at the time of the acquisition of the same" and 
that where improvements are replaced they are not such as 
were subject to taxation at that time. But the constitutional 
provision goes on to say specifically what improvements are 
exempt from taxation; namely, those which were construct eel 
by the city, and we held in the first San Francisco case, supra, 
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that to be such improvements, they must be wholly new struc-
tures, that replacements of existing improvements were 
simply not improvements of the exempt class. As seen, the 
issue is not one of valuation. This should be clear, for if the 
replacement eliminates the old improvement, there is no 
longer any improvement to tax, unless we look to the replace-
ment. When we do that we have something to tax, and the 
question is, what is that something, not what is its value. 
If we tax it by the current value of the old improvement, we 
are not taxing an article of property ; we are taxing a fiction. 
The difference in value does not make two separate articles of 
property. If the fiction is to be employed as the basis for 
fixing value, it would violate the spirit of the forepart of the 
above quoted constitutional provision that all property shall 
be taxed according to its value, for the replaced improvement 
would not be taxed according to that value. 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 7, 
1951. 
[L. A. No. 21143. In Bank. May 11, 1951.] 
ALFRED B. CASON, Respondent, v. THE GLASS BOTTLE 
BLOWERS ASSOCIATION etc., et al. (an Unincorpo-
rated Association), Appellants. 
[1] Associations-Intervention of Courts.-Mandate is available 
in this state against an unincorporated association. 
[2] Appearance-General Appearance-Waiver of Process.-In a 
mandamus proceeding seeking restoration to union member-
ship, the court does not err in refusing to quash service of 
summons, where defendants waive such service or defects 
therein by making a general appearance. 
[1] See 3 Cal.Jur. 354; 4 Am.Jur. 466. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Associations, § 12; [2] Appearance, 
§26; [3] Mandamus, §101; [4,5,7-10,12-20,22-25] Labor, §20; 
[6] Actions,§ 73; [11] Associations,§ 13; [21) Appeal and Error, 
§ 1560-1. 
